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APPLYING FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND

TO CAMPUS

SPEAKER BANS
To a sponsoring student group, an on-campus speech by someone
not formally affiliated with the academic community offers an opportunity to hear opinions often not presented in the classroom. But to
a university administrator, an outside speaker is often a potentially disruptive influence-likely to cause strife both within the academic community and between that community and the outside world. In the face
of student requests or demands to present an outside speaker, the
administrator may desire to regulate access to the school platform.
From this desire springs the institutional control: the speaker ban.1
Because advance permission to speak is required, the speaker
ban is an administrative prior restraint on the first amendment
rights of both audience and speaker.2 Although presumptively
invalid,3 prior restraints are not per se unconstitutional.4 Thus
courts in speaker ban cases have focused on the particular prior
restraint to determine whether it is administered to "suppress only
that speech which presents a 'clear and present danger' of resulting
in serious substantive evil which a university has a right to prevent." '
But although the courts have been active in articulating narrow
standards for administrative decisionmaking ° and in liberalizing
1 Under the speaker ban, university and college administrators determine who will
be permitted to speak on campus. When exercised by administrators of statesupported institutions, this authority is subject to constitutional restrictions because
first amendment rights of free speech, held applicable to the states as part of fourteenth amendment due process, see Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) ;
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), have also been held applicable to public
school boards as agencies of the state. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Developments in the Law---Academic Freedom, 81
HARv. L. Rv. 1045, 1056-64 (1968). Although a school might constitutionally ban
all outside speakers from campus, it cannot ban only some on a discriminatory basis.
See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (3-judge court) ;
Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 497 (M.D.N.C. 1968) ; Danskin v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545-46, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946). This Comment focuses upon a limited rather than a total speaker ban because virtually all
state-supported universities and colleges permit at least some outside speakers to
appear on campus. Comment, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss. L.J. 488, 493 (1967).
2 The prior restraint doctrine dates back at least to the eighteenth century. See
4 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52. The first case in which the doctrine
was given constitutional recognition by the Supreme Court, however, was Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
3 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
4Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); see Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1965) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
5 Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (3-judge court);
cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (3-judge
court) (clear and present danger). In Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F2d 595 (8th Cir.
1970), the court indicated that "the administrators could enforce a ban, if they could
reasonably forecast that [the proposed speaker's] presence on campus would substantially interfere with the work of school, the rights of students and the maintenance
of appropriate discipline." Id. at 599 (relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
(512)

1971]

CAMPUS SPEAKER BANS

standing requirements, 7 even the most explicit and far-reaching decision fails to insure that a proposed speaker will be banned only
after a judicial determination that his speech presents a clear and
present danger to the institution's orderly operation. This Comment
contends that only such a requirement can adequately protect freedom
of speech.
I. JUDICIAL RULEMAKING FOR THE CAMPUS
In Stacy v. Williams,8 students and faculty in the Mississippi state
university system attacked the constitutionality of regulations for offcampus speakers adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Institutions
of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi and applied to all
institutions under its supervision. After a finding that the Board's
regulations were unconstitutional, and after an unsuccessful attempt
by the Board to conform its regulations to constitutional requirements,
the district court granted relief in the form of its own set of regulations
"applicable to all institutions of higher learning within the state of
Mississippi." ,
In formulating its regulations, the court sought to establish an
integrated system which would protect both the school's legitimate
concern for peaceful and orderly operation and the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free speech.'
Under these regulations, proposed invitations may be requested only by recognized student or faculty groups
and may not be extended without the "prior written concurrence" of
the university head or his designee." Any request must be made at
least ten days before the proposed date of the speech and must contain
"the name of the sponsoring organization, the proposed date, time and
location of the meeting, the expected size of the audience and topic of
speech." ' The head of the institution is then given four days to
rule on the request, or the "submission shall be deemed granted." 11
The regulations provide explicit standards for administrative decisionmaking. Thus the head of the institution may deny the request
only if he or an authorized designee
7Standing to assert a denial of first amendment rights has been consistently
granted to the sponsoring group. See Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F2d 1171, 1172
(5th Cir. 1969) (first amendment right to hear) ; Smith v. University of Tennessee,
300 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (first amendment protection of speech
extends to audience); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 932 (N.D.
I1. 1968) (first amendment right to assemble to hear chosen speaker). See generally
Comment, Do College Students Have a Comstitutionally Protected Right to Hear
Outside Speakers?, 41 Miss. LJ. 135 (1969).
8306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (3-judge court).
9
Id. at 979.
10 The court deemed it a proper exercise of its equity powers to provide the
parties with relief in this fashion. The Board of Trustees could repeal the regulations,
because it was not required to formulate any rules, or could adopt other regulations
consistent with the court's opinion. Id. at 978-79.
11 Id. at 979.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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determines, after proper inquiry, that the proposed speech
will constitute a clear and present danger to the institution's
orderly operation by the speaker's advocacy' 4 of such
actions as:
1. The violent overthrow of the government of the United
States . . . or
2. The willful damage or destruction, or seizure and subversion, of the institution's buildings or other property; or
3. The forcible disruption or impairment of, or interference
with, the institution's regularly scheduled classes or other
educational functions; or
4. The physical harm, coercion, intimidation, or other invasion of lawful rights, of the institution's officials, faculty
members or students; or
5. Other campus disorder of a violent nature.' 5
The standards by which the existence of a clear and present danger
is determined permit the administrator to take into account the speaker's
past conduct. 6
If the request is denied, the sponsoring group has a right of appeal
for a de novo hearing within two days by a campus review committee
"composed of three faculty members and two students." '7 If the request is denied again, the sponsoring group may obtain judicial review,
and the court is to reverse or affirm following a hearing "conducted as
soon as practicable." 1"
These regulations clearly erect an elaborate procedural structure
for administering the speaker ban. Explicit standards restrict the administrator's discretion, and time limits assure that requests are not
denied by delay. Yet Molpus v. Fortune " demonstrates that these
procedural safeguards leave essentially untouched the potential for
abuse inherent in the speaker ban. Subject only to the check of judicial
review initiated by the sponsoring group, the school administrator,
14Advocacy is defined as preparing the group for imminent action, as distinguished from mere abstract espousal of a doctrine. Id. at 979 n.1.
15 Id.

at 979.

In determining the existence of a clear and present danger, the head of
the institution, or his authorized designee, may consider all relevant factors,
including whether such speaker has, within the past five years, incited violence
resulting in the destruction of property at any state educational institution
or has willfully caused the forcible disruption of regularly scheduled classes
or other educational functions at any such institution.
16

Id. at 979-80.
17 Id. at 980.

1Id.
19311 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Miss.), af'd, 432 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1970). For
another case decided under the rules, see Stacy v. Williams, 312 F. Supp. 742 (N.D.
Miss. 1970), in which the court invalidated the Board's denial of a request approved
earlier by the university president and the campus review committee.

19711

CAMPUS SPEAKER BANS

although formally complying with the Stacy rules, can still effectively
frustrate the exercise of first amendment rights.
On March 4, 1970, the University of Mississippi Young Democrats (UMYD) presented to Chancellor Fortune a request for permission to invite Tyrone Gettis to speak on March 18. Mr. Gettis was
president of the student body at Mississippi Valley State College
(MVSC) and the leader of recent demonstrations and a boycott which
had closed that school." Interested in receiving a firsthand report of
events given extensive coverage by the mass media, UMYD members
wanted a student's view of the "Crisis at MVSC." 21
That same day, Chancellor Fortune notified UMYD that he would
not approve the request. From newspaper clippings and conversations
with college officials, Chancellor Fortune concluded that "his appearance, as a guest speaker on the campus, would constitute a clear and
present danger to the institution's orderly operations, because of the
likelihood that Mr. Gettis would advocate [the evils listed in the Stacy
regulations] . .. .".
UMYD then requested review by the campus review committee
which, without making a record of the hearing or of its findings, voted
four to one against granting permission. On March 9, members of
UMYD brought a class action in the district court seeking an injunction directing the university to approve the request 2
The district court decided first that review of the committee's
action would be impossible because of the unavailability of a record,
and that a de novo hearing should be granted. After considering the
evidence anew, the court held that the university had failed to meet
its burden of showing by clear and convincing proof that the speech
would constitute a clear and present danger to its orderly operation.2 4
The court found that "Mr. Gettis proposes to limit his speech to a
discussion of the crisis at Mississippi Valley State College, as viewed
by him as a student leader." ' Should he extend his remarks and
2o UMYD also proposed to invite the president of MVSC. 432 F2d at 919.
21 This was the title of the proposed speech.
Id.
22311 F. Supp. at 242.
The chancellor's reasons for denying permission to
speak were a verbatim listing of the Stacy court's justifications. But as the evidence
later showed, "one of the attorneys for UMYD visited Mr. Gettis . . . and talked
with him about the proposed speech," and "Mr. Gettis assured [him] that his speech
would be devoted entirely to the assigned subject." Id. at 248. At the district court
hearing the evidence consisted of each side's witnesses' estimation whether Mr. Gettis
would present a clear and present danger. Id. Chancellor Fortune was one of the
witnesses. The court found that he "was not fearful that Mr. Gettis' appearance on
the campus would result in disorders such as occurred at [MVSC]." Rather, "Chancellor Fortune's main concern was to avoid a disturbance of any nature." Id.
23Mid. at 243. They also requested "an injunction to restrain the defendants
from further interference with the rights of students at the University to assemble
peaceably and to hear speeches made by speakers of their choice," and asked that the
court "establish procedural guidelines for the operation of the Campus Review Committee." Id. The district court refused to grant these two requests because the
Stacy24 court had retained jurisdiction of the matter. Id. at 244.
Id. at 246-49.
251d. at 249.
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advocate destruction of university property or similar violence, "there
does not appear to be a reasonable probability that [those evils] would
happen." 26
The university appealed. Despite their successful reliance on the
Stacy rules in the district court, the plaintiffs on cross-appeal sought
to have the court of appeals review the rules and hold them invalid
on the ground that the clear and present danger standards inadequately
protected first amendment rights.17 Plaintiffs also renewed their requests for an injunction that would require the university to institute
court action in order to ban a speaker and for the establishment of
"standards of administrative due process to deal with future hearings
before the Campus Review Committee." 28 The Fifth Circuit affirmed,
but refused to examine the validity of the Stacy rules, finding that the
plaintiffs were entitled to relief on the ground that the university had
failed to meet even the clear and present danger standards of those
rules.

29

Although not remarkable for its holding or legal analysis, 30 Molpus
does highlight the dangers inherent in relying upon administrative
determinations of the character of a proposed speech. As the district
court noted, "[we are] positive that [Chancellor Fortune and the
campus review committee] acted in good faith and in accord with that
which they thought would be for the best interests of the University."
They were, however, "overly cautious in their actions." 31

II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTRICTING
ACCESS

TO THE CAMPUS

In recent years, "courts have begun to construct a body of procedural law which defines the manner in which they and other bodies
must evaluate and resolve first amendment claims ....
," ' Allowing
a school administrator to ban a proposed speaker without first securing
a judicial determination of the character of the speech fails to satisfy
procedural standards the Supreme Court has set forth for the regulation
of other kinds of expression.
26d.
27 432 F2d at 920. The rules' clear and present danger standards are quoted at
note 16 spra.
2 432 F.2d at 920.
29
1d. at 921. The court added that it would review Stacy only when an action
was brought "seeking appropriate relief which challenges Stacy," and suggested that
because the Stacy court had retained jurisdiction for enforcement of the order, the
"ideal place" to begin such an action would be in the Stacy court itself. Id.
30 See Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F2d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1970) ("We have
been unable to find a single case decided in the 1960's in which a speaker ban has
been upheld by a federal court.") (footnote omitted) ; Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412
F2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 1027, 1050 (1969) ("[I]t is hardly surprising that I cannot find a single
case decided on its merits in this decade in which a speaker ban has been upheld

by a court.").

31311 F. Supp. at 249.
32 Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970).
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In Freedman v. Maryland,3 3 the Court reversed the conviction of
a movie exhibitor who had shown a film without first submitting it to
the state board of censors. The statute requiring submission imposed
upon the exhibitor the burden of securing judicial review of a board
decision banning a film and of proving that the film was protected
expression, and placed no time limits upon administrative or judicial
action.3 4 In holding this procedure unconstitutional, the Court ruled
that a system of censorship could not be administered so as to give an
effect of finality to the censor's determinations.
[B] ecause only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination
suffices to impose a valid final restraint. 35
To effectuate this principle, the Court required (1) that after submitting a film the exhibitor be "assured . . . that the censor will,
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to
restrain showing the film"; (2) that any restraint prior to a final
judicial determination be "limited to preservation of the status quo for
the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution";
and (3) that prompt, final judicial decision be assured.3 6 These requirements result from a recognition that a system of prior restraint
may easily abridge constitutional freedoms. Because permission must
be sought in every instance, the censor scrutinizes clearly protected as
well as borderline communication; 37 and censorship may become the
rule, freedom of expression the exception.
Freedman's basic requirement of a prompt, final judicial determination of the character of the proposed communication is even more
critical for the protection of first amendment rights in cases involving
university speakers than in those involving movie distributors.3, First,
restraint may cause irreparable harm to the political speaker and his
audience, but rarely more than delay and financial loss (perhaps only
temporary) to a distributor. As Mr. Justice Harlan remarked in a
decision holding unconstitutional a city ordinance requiring parade
licenses:
33 380 U.S. 51 (1965).

S4 d. at 59-60.
35
d. at 58. The Court also ruled that the censor must assume the burden of
proving that the film was constitutionally unprotected. Id.
36Id. at 59.
37
See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
648, 656-57 (1955).
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38

Nothing in the rationale of Freedinan,and its predecessors suggests that
their principles are confined to the obscenity area. In fact, when the subject
matter of speech is political in character rather than bordering on the
obscene, the need for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater.
Monaghan, supra note 32, at 524.
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Though a movie exhibitor might suffer some financial loss
if he were obliged to wait for a year or two while the administrative and judicial mills ground out a result, it is
nevertheless quite likely that the public would ultimately see
the film. In contrast, timing is of the essence in politics. It
is almost impossible to predict the political future; and when
an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice
heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all.89
Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted:
"It is vital to the operation of democratic government that
the citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before
them. A delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances. On the other hand, the subject of
sex is of constant but rarely particularly topical interest." "
Second, the requirement of judicial determination of the character
of the expression recognizes that "[b]ecause the censor's business is
to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive
than a court-part of an independent branch of government- to the
constitutionally protected interests in free expression." -U Yet a school
administrator may well be even less responsive than a censor to constitutional considerations. Neither training nor experience prepares
the administrator to apply complex constitutional standards to cases
demanding a careful sifting of issues and weighing of facts. Further,
he may have a greater interest in suppression than other censors.
Unlike, for example, a movie censor who can afford to risk exhibiting
a movie he thinks obscene, a school administrator faces the risk that a
proposed speech will lead to violence or other forms of campus disruption. And should such violence or disruption occur, the institution's trustees, the state legislature, and the public are likely to hold
him responsible. The result is administrative decisionmaking inevitably biased toward suppressing controversial speech.4
39 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
40 Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968)

(quoting A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964)

(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
41 380 U.S. at 57-58.
42
Attitudes of university and college administrators toward the presence of controversial speakers are described in E. WILLIAMSON & J. COWAN, THE AmERICAN

(1966), a study carried out in 1964 under the
auspices of the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators. Surveying
all areas of the country, the study is based upon data obtained from 849 colleges and
STUDENT's FREEDom OF EXPRESSION

universities. Administrators at these institutions were asked to respond to a question
distinguishing speakers who had spoken or would have been permitted to speak on

campus from those which "might be considered so 'controversial' that the administration would strongly question the advisability of their appearance." Id. 66. The

administration of 94% of the institutions surveyed would have allowed Earl Warren

to speak, and 80% would have found Martin Luther King acceptable. But only
slightly more than half would have welcomed George Wallace or James Hoffa (55%
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The Stacy rules fail to satisfy the Freedman requirements. 43
First, the three-judge court in Stacy set no time limits for rendering a
judicial determination. Although a court might voluntarily impose
upon itself a four-day limit " for reviewing and deciding a speaker ban
case arising under the Stacy rules, this time schedule was not observed
by the district court in Molpus.' Second, despite the Court's command
in Freedman that the censor's determinations have no effect of finality,
the failure of the Stacy rules to compel a judicial determination within
a specified time inevitably tends to make final the determinations of the
school administrator and the campus review committee. Reversal of
even clearly erroneous determinations depends upon the willingness of
those aggrieved to undertake costly and time-consuming litigation, 4 6
and both speaker and audience are precluded from exercising their
first amendment rights pending the outcome of the litigation.
and 51% respectively). And less than one third would have welcomed Malcolm X
or George Lincoln Rockwell (3017 and 21% respectively). In fact, even at the large
public and nonsectarian universities-the most permissive institutions-only 41%
would have openly accepted all of the 17 speakers listed on the questionnaire. Id. 72.
See also note 47 infra.
4 The rules fail to provide any procedural guidelines for the hearings before
the campus review committee or to indicate whether any weight is to be given the
committee's determinations. The district court in Molpus overcame these difficulties
by granting a hearing de novo, a proper procedure in light of Freedman and Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
44 Rule (3) requires that applications be submitted 10 days before the date of
the proposed speaking engagement, and that the head of the institution act within
4 days. Rule (5) requires that the campus review committee conduct a hearing
within 2 days of the filing of an appeal from the determination of the head of the
institution, leaving 4 days for judicial review and determination. 306 F. Supp. at
979-80.
45 The plaintiffs presented their request to the university on March 4, with a
speaking engagement scheduled for March 18. The complaint was filed in the district
court on March 9, a hearing was held on March 14, counsel presented oral arguments
on March 25, and the date of decision was March 31. 311 F. Supp. at 241-43.
46The Stacy rules place the burden of seeking a hearing before the campus
review committee upon the sponsoring organization aggrieved by a decision of the
administrator. 306 F. Supp. at 980. Further, the committee's determinations "shall
be final,- unless judicial review is sought" by a "sponsoring organization aggrieved
by [its] action." Id. Although the reviewing court may conduct a hearing de novo
to determine the character of the proposed speech, note 43 supra, this procedure fails
to overcome the effect of finality given the administrative determinations. The
Freedman requirement of a timely judicial determination rests upon the Court's belief
that in the absence of such a requirement, an administrative determination infringing
first amendment rights might easily go unchallenged simply because of a lack of
interest in litigation on the part of the parties affected.
[I]t may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determination.
Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter
exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor's stake in any one picture may
be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous course of litigation. The
distributor, on the other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens
and delays of litigation ....
380 U.S. at 59. Similarly, because delay in presentation may deprive a proposed
speech of any value, the sponsoring group will often not be strongly motivated to
secure judicial review of a denied request. Further, the sponsoring group would
have to bear the cost of attorneys' fees. For example, the plaintiffs in Stacy requested that the university be required to pay $18,280 in fees. Although the court
denied the request because it was not made within a reasonable time after the entry
of judgment, it indicated that such requests would generally be denied. Stacy v.
Williams, 50 F.R.D. 52, 54-55 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (3-judge court).
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CONCLUSION

Banning controversial individuals from the campus may strike
administrators as an effective means for insuring tranquility and avoiding public criticism,47 but "[f] ear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly." 4 Controversial speech
should be met not with suppression but with reasoned rebuttal, for
truth can emerge only through the clash of ideas.4 9 Although school
administrators are necessarily vested with discretionary power to set
reasonable regulations of time and place for the presentation of
speakers," ° prohibition of a proposed speech should require a judicial
determination that the speech presents a clear and present danger to
the institution's orderly operation. Only a tribunal whose members
are insulated from the pressures of campus administration can adequately balance the right to speak against the need to maintain order."
41
In 1964, 32% of campus administrators surveyed in a study done for the
National Association of Student Personnel Administrators indicated that considerable
criticism had resulted from the appearance or from the proposed or actual invitation
of certain speakers. E. WnLamsoNr & J.CowAN, supra note 42, at 79. The major
source of criticism was identified as off-campus conservative groups such as the
John Birch Society. Id. Asked to identify speakers whose invitation to speak or
actual appearance had caused considerable criticism, campus administrators listed such
names as the following: Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Justice William Douglas,
Roy Wilkins, Eleanor Roosevelt, Nelson Rockefeller, Strom Thurmond, Eunice
Shriver,
Edward Kennedy, and Justice Thurgood Marshall. Id. 79-80.
48
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

49 Id. at 377.

5o See Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (3-judge
court)51 ; Wright, supra note 30, at 1043.
See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 522-24.

